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This study attempts to determine whether there are common
characteristics between examiners who issue invalidated patents. This
study uses two new patent databases that code for nearly 1.7 million
patents and approximately one thousand patents that were litigated to
a 'final" judgment between 2010 and 2011. This study finds that
approximately one-third of patents that are litigated to final judgment
are found invalid. Most invalidated patents are found in technology
centers 1600, 2600, and 2700,1 which correspond to biotechnology and
organic chemistry, communications, and computer science, respectively.
Most patents are invalidated on prior art-type novelty and obviousness
grounds. This study also determined that: (1) litigated patents mainly
come from primary examiners (those examiners with more experience),
and (2) primary examiners that grant between thirty and sixty patents
per year are issuing a higher number of invalidated patents.
Interestingly, the highest volume primary examiners (examiners who
on average grant more than one hundred patents per year and have
more than seven years of experience) issue very few litigated patents
that are later found invalid. Most of the patents that were invalidated
in this data set were done so via the prior art language of 35 U.S.C.
Associate Professor, West Virginia University College of Law. Sincere thanks to the
many readers who offered comments on earlier drafts, including Michael Risch, Jason Rantanen,
Courtney Brinckerhoff, Benjamin Berkowitz, and the participants of the 2012 Center for the
Protection of Intellectual Property Edison Fellows. Additional thanks to the research assistants
who were instrumental in coding the data: Ryan Campione, Gregory Pennington, Limian Fang,
Evan Gallo, Samantha Stevfanov, Katherine Bomkamp, Andrew Hilber, Sean Conrecode, and
Amy Purpura. This work was funded in part by the generous support of the West Virginia
University College of Law Hodges Research Fund and the Thomas Edison Innovation Fellowship
of the George Mason University School of Law.
1. In 2000, technology center 2700 (computers, communication and e-commerce) was
split into 2100 (computer architecture, software and information security) and 2600
(communications). See also Office of the Chief Communications Officer, UNITED STATES PATENT
AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ahrpa/opa/ptotoday/
ptotoday 1l.pdf [http://perma.cc/37NH-S33W].
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§§ 102-103. Approximately 77 percent of the prior art references used
to invalidate patents were not found by the US Patent and Trademark
Office (USPTO) during examination. Additionally, 38 percent of the
prior art references used to invalidate patents were US patents or US
patent applications. Of those invalidating references that were US
patents or patent applications, approximately 89 percent were not
found by the examiner. These data imply that improving PTO
searching could improve patent quality.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Preventing examination errors should always be an aspiration
for all examiners at the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).
Patent examination is not a homogenous process and can vary
dramatically depending on the examiner.2  The variation in
2. Ian M. Cockburn, Samuel Kortum & Scott Stern, Are All Patent Examiners Equal?
Examiners, Patent Characteristics, and Litigation Outcomes, in PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-
BASED ECONOMY 20 (W.M. Cohen & S.A. Merrill, eds., 2003); Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat,
Examining Patent Examination, 2010 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 2 (2010); Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven
136 [Vol. 18:1:135
INVALIDATED PATENTS
examination quality is so great that some commentators argue that
there may be as many patent offices as patent examiners.3 Building
on two previous studies,4 this study collects and analyzes a novel
dataset on patent examiners and patent outcomes. This dataset is
based on 2,152 patents associated with a final decision issued on
validity between 2010 and 2012. Of these 2,152 patents, examiner
data and prosecution histories were available for 622 patents. Of
these 622 patents, 216 were found invalid. For each of the 622
patents, this study identifies a USPTO working examiner and collects
statistics derived from his or her patent examination history between
2000 and 2012. This study then attempts to determine if there are
common characteristics among examiners who issue invalidated
patents.
Some commentators argue that there has been a dramatic
increase in patent litigation in recent years.5 Indeed, 5,189 patent
actions were filed in 2012, which represents the highest number of
patent litigation actions ever recorded.6  The number of patents
granted by the USPTO has also steadily increased. From 2011 to
2012, the number of patents granted by the USPTO increased by 11
percent to 270,258.7 Adjusting for inflation, the median damages
award ranged from $1.9 million in 1995 to $16.5 million in 2015, with
an overall median award of $5.5 million over the last eighteen years.
8
Sampat, Is the Patent Office a Rubber Stamp? 58 EMORY L.J. 181 (2008); Sean Tu, Luck/ Unluck
of the Draw: An Empirical Study of Examiner Allowance Rates, 2012 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 10
(2012).
3. Cockburn, Kortum & Stern, supra note 2, at 28. Note that as of February 2013,
there were 7,865 patent examiners. Data Visualization Center, UNITED STATES PATENT AND
TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/dashboards/patents/main.dashxml
[http://perma.cc/7K3E-Y755] (download .xls spreadsheet at the bottom of the webpage for
historical PTO staffing data).
4. Tu, supra note 2; Shine Tu, Patent Examiners and Litigation Outcomes, 17 STAN.
TECH. L. REV. 507 (2014).
5. James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, 99
CORNELL L. REV. 387, 388 (2014); see also Christopher A. Cotropia, Jay P. Kesan & David L.
Schwartz, Patent Assertion Entities (PAEs) Under the Microscope: An Empirical Investigation of
Patent Holders as Litigants, 99 CORNELL L. REV 425 (2014) (showing that the raw number of
patent lawsuits filed by non-operating companies substantially increased from 2010 to 2012, but
this phenomenon is likely driven by procedural rule changes relating to joinder passed with the
2011 patent reform).
6. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, 2013 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY 6 fig. 1 (2013),
https://www.pwc.com/us/en/forensic-services/publications/assets/
2 0 1 3-patent-litigation-study.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2JB5-VXTN] (based on USPTO: Performance and Accountability Report and
US Courts: Judicial Facts & Figures). Note that some of this increase is due to the changes in the
anti-joinder provision of the American Invents Act (AIA).
7. Id.
8. Id. at 7.
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Accordingly, errors that could be prevented at the USPTO would save
litigants and consumers millions of dollars.
This Article attempts to identify commonalities between
examiners who issue invalidated patents. Part II discusses patent
office procedure and the patent examination process. Part III surveys
previous empirical studies designed to evaluate patent litigation. Part
IV explores the novel dataset and the methodology used to evaluate
this dataset. Part V presents the results of this evaluation by
examiner characteristics, and Part VI presents the results by
invalidity type. Part VII presents a solution to some of the major
issues facing examiners. Finally, Part VIII summarizes the findings.
This study finds that most utility patents are invalided via novelty
and obviousness type grounds, and much of the prior art that is used
to invalidate patents are US patents or US patent applications.
Finally, our findings show that examiners are not finding the prior art
correctly instead of simply misinterpreting prior art that was
previously found in their search.
II. BACKGROUND
The USPTO employs some 7,800 patent examiners9 and
manages a budget of approximately $3 billion dollars. Many scholars
argue that not only is litigation a tax on innovation but also that the
USPTO increases the amount of litigation by granting low-quality
patents.10 However, patent examiners could play an important role in
9. As of February 2013, there were 7,865 patent examiners. Data Visualization Center,
supra note 3.
10. John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated
Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185 (1998); John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley, Kimberly A. Moore & R.
Derek Trunkey, Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435 (2004); John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley &
Joshua Walker, Extreme Value or Trolls on Top? The Characteristics of the Most-Litigated
Patents, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2009); Colleen V. Chien, Predicting Patent Litigation, 90 TEX. L.
REV. 283 (2011); Jean 0. Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, Patent Quality and Research
Productivity: Measuring Innovation with Multiple Indicators, 114 ECON. J. 441 (2004); Jean 0.
Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, Protecting Intellectual Property Rights: Are Small Firms
Handicapped? 47 J.L. & ECON. 45 (2004); Jean 0. Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman,
Characteristics of Patent Litigation: A Window on Competition, 32 RAND J. ECON. 129 (2001);
Kimberly A. Moore, Worthless Patents, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1521 (2005); see also Donald R.
Dunner & Gerald Mossinghoff, Increasing the Certainty in Patent Litigation: The Need for
Federal Circuit Approved Pattern Jury Instructions, 83 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 431,
432-33 (2001); Paul M. Janicke, On the Causes of Unpredictability of Federal Circuit Decisions in
Patent Cases, 3 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 93, 93-94 (2005); Jay P. Kesan, David L. Schwartz
& Ted Sichelman, Paving the Path to Accurately Predicting Legal Outcomes: A Comment on
Professor Chien's Predicting Patent Litigation, 90 TEX. L. REV. 97 (2012); see also Lee
Petherbridge, On Predicting Patent Litigation, 90 TEX. L. REV. 75 (2012). See Ted Sichelman,




reducing litigation by acting as a gatekeeper to stronger patents
through quality examination.
According to a recent Government Accountability Office (GAO)
report on patent litigation and patent quality, the number of patent
infringement lawsuits from 2010 to 2011 has increased by about one
third.1 ' Stakeholders in patent litigation identified three key
observations that account for the trend.12 First, stakeholders were
concerned about both patents with unclear property rights and
patents with overly broad or unclear claims. This lack of clarity may
be the result of, for example, patent holders' use of vague terminology
and a lack of common vocabularies for describing concepts,
innovations, or ideas.13 Second, stakeholders are concerned with
damages, specifically large monetary awards for patents that make
only a small contribution to an overall product. Disproportionately
large damage awards can also incentivize patent owners to file
lawsuits in the hope that the accused infringer will settle to avoid
going to court. Some stakeholders also argue that damage awards
were outsized and did not reflect the value of the patent or the
patent's contribution to the product at issue.14 Third, stakeholders
have become more aware that patents are a valuable asset that can be
asserted against competitors.
15
In order to address patent quality, the USPTO has
implemented several programs directed towards patent quality and
patent search.16  For example, the USPTO issued supplemental
guidelines for the examination of the definiteness and functional
language in computer-implemented claims. According to USPTO
officials, these supplemental guidelines attempt to make the
examination of applications consistent and the resulting patents
clearer across all technologies.17  Additionally, the USPTO
implemented the Cooperative Patent Classification (CPC) in 2013 to
help companies and patent applicants conduct more effective searches
for patents that may pose infringement issues.'8 The CPC improved
11. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-13-465, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
ASSESSING FACTORS THAT AFFECT PATENT INFRINGEMENT LITIGATION COULD HELP IMPROVE
PATENT QUALITY 1 (2013).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 28.
14. Id. at 33.
15. Id. at 28.
16. Patent searching includes finding the most appropriate and closest related prior art
references both in the patent and non-patent literature.
17. GAO-13-465, supra note 11, at 39.
18. GAO-13-465, supra note 11, at 40-41.
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searching by enabling more frequent updates of patent classes so that
similar technologies can be more effectively grouped together.19
The high cost of patent litigation has spurred judicial changes
to the handling of patent cases. First, high discovery costs contribute
to these excessive legal costs, with a median legal cost at $700,000
when less than $1 million is at stake.20  Next, some courts have
recently introduced a patent pilot program that assigns patent cases
to district court judges who have expertise in patent cases, and other
courts are experimenting with new rules designed to streamline and
reduce the expense of patent litigation.2'
The USPTO can correct errors in prosecution after the patent
has issued. The remedies available to the applicant vary depending
on the severity of the error. For example, if the error is minor or
clerical, the USPTO can issue a certificate of correction. If the error is
substantive, the applicant can start the reissue or the ex parte
reexamination process. Third parties can also challenge the patent
using either the ex parte or inter partes22 reexamination process, or
new Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA) proceedings such as
post-grant review and inter partes review. Importantly, once a patent
is in litigation, the USPTO has limited involvement.23 Accordingly,
the biggest impact that the USPTO can have on litigation may be to
make sure patent quality is strong by searching, finding, and
considering the relevant prior art before the patent application
matures to an issued patent.
III. CURRENT LITERATURE
Several empirical studies have been conducted regarding
patents and patent examination. The most relevant are outlined
below. First, Cockburn, Kortum, and Stern (2003) correlated the
effects of specific examiner characteristics (such as tenure at the
USPTO, the number of patents they have examined, and the degree to
which the patents they examine are later cited by other patents) and
19. GAO-13-465, supra note 11, at 41.
20. The American Intellectual Property Law Association (AIPLA) found that for a claim
that is less than $1 million, the median legal costs are $700,000. When $10 million to $25 million
is considered "at risk," median litigation costs can hit $3.3 million. For a claim over $25 milion,
median legal costs are $5.5 million. AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS'N., REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC
SURVEY 1-129-1-131.
21. Pub. L. No. 111-349, 124 Stat. 3674 (2011).
22. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, ch. 31, Pub. L. No. 112-29. Inter partes
reexamination was phased out by the AIA and replaced by inter partes review. Ex parte
reexamination continues to be available post-AIA. Id.
23. A court can stay litigation if there is a pending inter partes review. See id.
[Vol. 18:1:135
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how their issued patents fared in litigation.24 Cockburn et al. found
that examiner fixed effects25 can explain the variation in the
characteristics of issued patents. Specifically, they found that there is
no evidence that examiner experience or workload at the time a patent
is issued affected the probability that the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit (CAFC) would find that patent invalid, and examiners
whose patents tended to be more frequently cited often have a higher
probability of a CAFC invalidity ruling.26 The dataset that Cockburn
et al. used was based on only 182 patents for which the CAFC ruled on
validity between 1997 and 2000.27 In contrast, this study is more
comprehensive because it includes all litigation proceedings where
there is a final ruling on validity. This study is also broader because it
includes final judgments not only from the CAFC, but also from all
district courts between 2010 and 2012.
Allison and Lemely (the "AL study") also previously scrutinized
examiners and patent quality using a very similar method.28 Allison
et al. reviewed 299 patents associated with 239 different cases in
either district courts or the Federal Circuit between 1989 and 1996.29
Similar to this study, the dataset used by Allison et al. did not include
appeals from the rejection of a patent application by the USPTO
Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences30 or appeals from the US
International Trade Commission (USITC). The AL study found
several interesting trends: (1) approximately 54 percent of all litigated
patents were held valid, (2) novelty arguments based on prior art and
statutory bars31 fared better than obviousness arguments,32 (3) there
was virtually no difference between the validity rates of patents in
different fields of invention, and (4) uncited prior art was more likely
to invalidate a patent than previously cited art.33 The AL study,
however, was limited because it was based only on patent validity
decisions that finally resolved the case on the merits and reported
24. Cockburn, Kortum & Stern, supra note 2, 21.
25. Id. at 22 (defining "examiner fixed effects" as effects that are significant even after
controlling for the patent's technology field. These effects include number and pattern of
citations received, the number and pattern of citations made, and the approval time.).
26. Id. at 20, 22.
27. Id. at 21.
28. Allison & Lemley, supra note 10, at 194, 201.
29. Id. at 194.
30. The Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences is now called the Patent Trial and
Appeal Board. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, sec. 7, Pub. L. No. 112-29.
31. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2015).
32. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2015).
33. Allison & Lemley, supra note 10, at 231-34; see also Allison, Lemley, & Schwartz,
supra note 10, at 1782.
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decisions available in the United States Patent Quarterly.
Accordingly, many decisions in this study were appellate decisions.34
Allison, Lemley, and Schwartz (the "ALS study") updated and
expanded the previous AL study with a new hand-coded data set.3 5
The ALS study found that: (1) the single largest category of
adjudicated challenges was for indefiniteness,3 6 (2) patentees only won
26 percent of the time (but if the case reached the trial stage,
patentees won 60.7 percent of the trials),37 (3) several districts were
correlated with higher win rates for either the accused infringer or
patentee,38 (4) if the patentee asserts more than one patent, then the
patentee was more likely to win,39 (5) foreign litigants were much
more likely to prevail in court in a merits decision compared to
domestic litigants,40 and (6) observable characteristics of the patents
do not seem to have much influence on the outcome of the cases.41
What makes the present study unique is that it links the patent
litigation data to the specific examiners that issued the patent.
Accordingly, this study is able to determine if there are any common
characteristics between those examiners who issue litigated patents
that are later found invalid.
Lemley and Sampat concluded that more experienced
examiners were less active in searching for prior art and had a much
higher grant rate.42 Additionally, they found that most examiners
cited to patented prior art references and not publications.43 From
these data, Lemely inferred that senior examiners are doing less
work-rather than merely getting it right-more often than junior
examiners.44 Previous studies have also shown that senior examiners
allow a higher percentage of applications compared to their junior
counterparts.45 In contrast to the Lemley study, this study attempts
34. Allison & Lemley, supra note 10, at 240 ("[Alpproximately one-half of the cases in
the population are appellate decisions (146 out of 299)."); see also Allison, Lemley, & Schwartz,
supra note 10, at 1769.
35. Allison, Lemley, & Schwartz, supra note 10, at 1769.
36. Id. at 1782.
37. Id. at 1790.
38. Id. at 1791.
39. Id. at 1796.
40. Id. at 1797.
41. Id. at 1798-99.
42. Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Examiner Characteristics and Patent Office
Outcomes, 94 REV. ECON. & STAT. 817, 817 (2012); see also, Tu, supra note 2, at tbl. 1 (showing
that primary examiners comprise a smaller percentage of examiners but issue the majority of
patents in most technology centers).
43. Lemley & Sampat, supra note 42, at 817.
44. Id. at 822.
45. Tu, supra note 2, at 50.
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to test the inference regarding patent quality by using litigation as a
proxy for quality. Invalidated patents are patents that should not
have been issued usually because of some patentability problem. By
focusing on invalidated patents, this study attempts to measure poor
examination because many of these issues could have been prevented
during the USPTO examination process. Accordingly, this study
determines if senior examiners are not only doing less work but also
doing a poor job by allowing the creation of invalid patents.
Finally, Janicke and Ren created a database of 262 cases from
all dispositive decisions of the Federal Circuit from 2002 to 2004.46
Janicke and Ren found that approximately 25 percent of the 262
dispositive cases were won by the patent owner.47 Additionally,
Janicke and Ren found that only three factors were statistically
significant to case outcomes: patentee financial strength, jury verdict,
and the type of law firm (intellectual property boutique or general
firm) chosen by the winning side.48  Surprisingly, the type of
technology in the patent was only marginally significant.49 Finally,
Janicke and Ren confirmed that foreign companies win as patentees at
a slightly higher rate than the patentees overall.50
IV. DESCRIPTION OF STUDY
A. Litigation Population
5l
As an initial matter, many of the 622 cases analyzed by this
study were complex. These sophisticated cases had long procedural
histories and complex opinions. Thus, each case was hand coded by
the author, and student coders were not used. Relying on a single
coder enhanced internal consistency.
The study's population consists of 2,152 patents litigated in 771
different cases. Each of these cases represents a written, final validity
46. Paul M. Janicke & LiLan Ren, Who Wins Patent Infringement Cases? 34 AIPLA Q.J.
1, 4 (2006) (defining "dispositive" as cases where at least one claim of one patent is finally
adjudicated to have been infringed and not invalid or unenforceable (patentee wins), or in which
it has been finally determined that no claim has these characteristics (accused infringer wins)).
47. Id. at 5.
48. Id. at 12.
49. Id at 12, 18 (showing only marginal effects for area of technology, but this could be
due to the relative imbalance of data associated with the area of technology).
50. Id. at 22.
51. This study is a population study and not a sample study. Although I am using a
population, I am able to perform statistical testing. As discussed in more detail in Part IV, one
can perform hypothesis testing and prediction from a population by treating the population as a
subset of the greater population (for example, a hypothetical population of all past and future
validity opinions.) See M.E. Thompson, Superpopulation Models, in 9 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
STATISTICAL SCIENCES 93, 93-99 (1988).
2015]
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decision by either district courts or the Federal Circuit between 2010
and 2012. The dataset also includes all patent lawsuits filed in a
federal district court that terminated between January 1, 2010 and
December 31, 2012.
This study used several sources to generate this dataset: (1) a
LexisNexis-based patent search, (2) the Lex Machina52 database to
validate and supplement the data source, and (3) the patstats.org53
and (4) PricewaterhouseCoopers litigation dataset54 to capture any
possible missing cases. All datasets were merged, and duplicate cases
were removed. The final data set comprised all patent litigation that
reached a final decision. Once the dataset was complete, docket
reports were reviewed. Docket reports included all relevant orders,
opinions, motions, verdicts, appellate rulings, and other miscellaneous
court documents needed to code the litigation outcomes.
The population only includes validity decisions on issued US
utility patents. This includes reexaminations and reissued patents.
Additionally, this study includes decisions on unenforceability due to
misuse, inequitable conduct, estoppel, and other similar bases.55
Only cases with reported, written decisions are included in the
population. This includes cases denominated "not for publication" by
the Federal Circuit, as well as district court opinions that are not
included in the Federal Supplement. This study includes cases in
which it could be determined from the opinion that a final decision
had been reached in favor of the patentee on at least one claim of at
least one patent, or that a final decision had been reached in favor of
the accused infringer. However, this study excludes decisions that
only include jury verdicts or opinions that do not include rationales on
the validity of a patent by the district court judge. These data were
excluded because they would create a subset of cases that could not be
compared to the larger dataset. Thus, this study excludes cases
without an explanation of invalidation because it would be difficult to
determine if the issue could have been prevented at the USPTO level.
This study uses patents as the unit of analysis. Thus, for each
case, the outcome was separately coded for each asserted patent. For
example, if an opinion was rendered on three patents in one case, then
an outcome was recorded separately for each patent. Additionally, if
52. LEX MACHINA, https://Ilexmachina.com/ [http://perma.ccXX98-H8XU].
53. Patstats.org is a resource for patent litigation statistics posted by the University of
Houston Law Center Institute for Intellectual Property and Information Law. PATSTATS.ORG,
http://patstats.org/ [http://perma.cc/D3M3-QVU8].
54. The author obtained a private copy of this dataset from PriceWaterhouseCooper for
academic purposes. It is not a publicly available dataset.
55. However, these legal rationales for invalidity were excluded in the analysis because
they are not preventable by the examiner during prosecution.
[Vol. 18:1:135
INVALIDATED PATENTS
multiple claims were in question within a single patent, the patent
was recorded as "invalid" if any one claim was found invalid. This, of
course, biases the population towards invalidation. Because this
study focuses mainly on preventative measures that could have been
taken at the USPTO level, preventative measures most likely could
have been taken at the USPTO level-even if a patent had valid
claims-so long as there was one invalid claim.
Summary judgment opinions were coded only if they resulted
in a final resolution with a corresponding rationale. The denial of
summary judgment does not always result in a final solution but can
mean that there is an unresolved disputed issue of material fact.
Accordingly, summary judgments that did not result in a final ruling
in either direction were not recorded. However, if a summary
judgment ruling resulted in a final ruling, then the summary
judgment ruling was coded.
B. Examiner Population and Corresponding Patents
The population of examiners includes every examiner who
issued any patent between 2001 and 2011 in every active art unit,
5 6
sorted by art unit, application filing date, issue date, primary
examiner, or secondary examiner. These data include only utility
patents and are unfiltered for reexamination patents, reissue patents,
continuations, continuations in part, divisional applications, and
applications directed at foreign filings. Plant and design patents are
not included in this data set. This database allows us to determine
the type of examiner (primary or secondary) and the rate at which
each examiner type issues patents. A detailed description of the
collection and analysis for the examiner database has been previously
published and is summarized below.57 The collection, limitations, and
interpretation of this database have also previously been described.
5
A previous study audited those examiners who were approving
patents to determine if there were common characteristics between
examiners who allowed cases. Accordingly, this study coded for every
patent issued between January 2001 and June 2011 (approximately
56. "When an application is sent to the PTO, it is reviewed to make sure all procedural
requirements are met for a filing date. Applications are then sorted for examination by
'technology center' and 'art unit.' Each technology center represents a broad technology type, for
example, technology center 1600 represents 'biochemistry and organic chemistry.' Within each
technology center are many 'art units.' Each art unit represents a narrower group of technology
within the technology center, for example, 1642 represents 'Antibody Engineering and Cancer
Immunology."' Tu, supra note 2, at 12.
57. See generally Tu, supra note 2.
58. See id. at 54-63.
20151
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1.7 million patents). Each patent was matched with a specific
"working" examiner.5 9 An average number of patents issued per year
could be calculated for each examiner by simply summing the "number
of patents issued"60 divided by the "years of service" as an examiner.61
The previous study found that more experienced primary examiners
(those examiners with more than five years of experience) were
allowing cases at a much higher rate than less experienced secondary
examiners (usually those examiners with fewer than three years of
experience) .62
In this study, each patent that was litigated to a final decision
was matched with the examiner database. Accordingly, the database
used in this study contains a profile of examiners associated with
issued patents that later underwent litigation.
C. Data Assembled
The data set assembled for the present study includes
information about: (1) the litigation, (2) the patent, and (3) the
examiner(s) associated with the litigated patent. The following data
were collected from litigation records:
1. Case name, citation, and termination date;
2. Whether the patent was held valid or invalid;
3. Whether the patent was infringed or non-infringed;





e. Patentable subject matter;
f. Utility;
59. See id. at 58 ('The 'working examiner' is the examiner who did the most direct work
on that application. This is the secondary examiner (if present) or the primary examiner if there
was no secondary examiner.").
60. See id. at 39. ('The 'number of patents' issued includes all patents issued by the
specific examiner between January 2001 and July 2011.").
61. See id. at 20. The "years of service" figure does not include those years where the
examiner issued only one patent. This was done to remove examiners who fell within particular
categories: (1) those examiners who were only briefly at the USPTO, but left before issuing more
than one patent, (2) those examiners who are primary examiners who mainly review the work of
secondary examiners but issued one patent by themselves, (3) those examiners who have issued
one patent, but have not issued any since, (4) those examiners hired at the end of the year, who
may have issued only one patent due to the ramp up time, and (5) examiners who came back to
the USPTO and needed time to ramp up during their return year.
62. Tu, supra note 2, at 49 (referring to the Lemley and Sampat 2011 studies).
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g. Section 102 prior art;
63




k. Incorrect inventorship; or
1. Inequitable conduct or latches;
5. If a prior art reference was cited in a 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 or 103 rejection, what
type of reference was cited (US patent, US published patent application,
foreign patent, foreign published patent application, non-patent literature, or
foreign non-patent literature);
6. If a prior art reference was cited in a 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 or 103 rejection,
whether the prior art reference was cited in the prosecution history; and
7. If the prior art reference was cited in the prosecution history, whether the
prior art was interpreted differently by the court.
As an initial matter, it is important to note that the examiner
data covers only the years from 2001 to 2012. Accordingly, if an
examiner had years of experience prior to 2001, it is not captured by
this dataset. Thus, if an examiner had more than eleven years of
experience, the data could only capture the examiner's work history
between 2001 and 2011. Information regarding the examiners
includes:
1. Patent numbers, technology center, and art unit;
2. Primary examiner name;
3. Secondary examiner name (if applicable);
4. File date;
5. Issue date;
6. Number of years as a patent examiner as of date when invalidated patent was
issued (covers 2001 to 2011 only, so if the patent was issued in 2006 and the
litigation, involving the decision of an examiner who joined the USPTO in
2002, did not conclude until 2010, the examiner was coded as having four
years of experience);
7. Number of patents issued during the year that invalidated patent was issued;
8. Total number of years as a patent examiner during the 2001 to 2011 period;
9. Average number of patents issued per year (sum total of all patents issued
between 2001 and 2012, divided by the number of years examiner was at the
office between 2001 and 2011).65
63. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012) (defining "prior art" as prior art references such as
patents, patent applications, or any printed publications).
64. See id. (defining "non-prior art" as including things such as the on-sale bar, public
use, or otherwise available to the public).
65. I did not count those years in which an examiner issues one and only one patent.
Accordingly, the data set is right censored in that I removed many of the examiners with the
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In a previous study, I created a database of every patent issued
between 2001 and 2011.66 Although both the primary and the
secondary examiner (if applicable) were coded for, the examiner linked
with the litigation is the "working" examiner.67 The working examiner
is the examiner who did the most direct work on that application.68
Thus, the working examiner would be the secondary examiner (if
present) or the primary examiner if there was no secondary examiner.
D. Limitations
A primary limitation of this study stems from the
unavailability of the application data categorized by art unit. Thus,
these data suffer from a "denominator" limitation because it is
unknown how many applications were filed and then reviewed by any
specific examiner per year. Accordingly, this study does not capture
those applications that were filed and abandoned by the applicant or
those applications that are still currently under review by the
examiner. As a result, I cannot determine the percentage of allowed
patents per year per art unit.
A secondary limitation stems from the timeframe of the
population selected. On September 16, 2011, the AIA created a new
joinder statute in 35 U.S.C. § 299. This provision was intended to
"address problems occasioned by the joinder of defendants (sometimes
numbering in the dozens) who have tenuous connections to the
underlying disputes in patent infringement suits.' 69 The joinder
statute forces plaintiffs to file multiple lawsuits against multiple
defendants instead of filing a single suit that names multiple
defendants. Cotropia et al. have shown that the changes to the AIA
have created a dramatic increase in the raw number of patent
lawsuits filed, but this increase is driven almost entirely by the new
lowest allowance rates. Accordingly, I have removed examiners who could fall within these
categories: (1) those examiners who were only briefly at the USPTO, but left before issuing more
than one patent, (2) those examiners who are primary examiners who mainly review the work of
secondary examiners but issued one patent by themselves, (3) those examiners who have issued
one patent, but have not issued any since, (4) those examiners hired in December who may have
issued only one patent because of the ramp up time, and (5) examiners who came back to the
USPTO and needed time to ramp up during their return year. Additionally, these data do not
capture those examiners who truly have a zero allowance rate, since this data set only records
those examiners who have issued at least one patent.
66. Tu, supra note 2, at 10.
67. Id. at 58.
68. Morrison & Foerster LLP, Behind the Scenes at the USPTO: Accounting for the
Supervisory Patent Examiner, LEXOLOGY, http://www.lexology.comllibrary/
detail.aspx?g=ef96f684-f70e-4860-8bbd-84300761e3a6 [https:H/perma.cc/JQP4-UAGN (defining
"assistant examiner" as a "junior" or "secondary" examiner).
69. H.R. REP. No. 112-98, at 54 (2011).
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joinder rule.70 Because this dataset only includes lawsuits that have
terminated between 2010 and 2012, many of these new non-joinder
lawsuits are not included in the dataset. Because I code for each
patent associated with a lawsuit, if multiple lawsuits are associated
with the same patent, this study could have a disproportionately high
number of valid patents found.
71
Another limitation is that while I use a broad database, it suffers
from some selection bias due to the examiner-matching step.
Specifically, temporal selection bias occurs in the database since the
examiner database contains only those patents that were issued
between 2001 and 2012. Accordingly, litigation dealing with older
patents (i.e., those patents issued before 2001) are not included in our
database. Additionally, there may be a "left justification" issue because
the dataset begins in 2001, so examiners who have worked prior to 2001
(inclusive) will be coded as working fewer years than they actually
worked. For example, if an examiner started working in 1998 and quit
in 2003, our database would code the examiner as working for three
years, while in actuality the examiner was at the office for six years.
Thus, these data may be slightly positively skewed. One of the reasons
why this study focuses on lawsuits that terminated in 2010 to 2012
was to abate this factor.72 Specifically, most of the litigated patents
examined were issued between 2001 and 2009.
73
Because this study focuses on common characteristics of patent
examiners who issue invalid patents, these data are slightly biased.
Specifically, when coding, this study selects for invalid cases. For
example, if any one claim in the patent was held invalid, the entire
patent was coded as invalid, even if other claims in the patent were
held valid. Accordingly, the dataset is biased towards a higher
invalidation rate. Because this study is interested in characteristics of
those examiners who issue any invalid claim, this is a fair selection
method.
70. Christopher A. Cotropia, Jay P. Kesan & David L. Schwartz, Patent Assertion
Entities (PAEs) Under the Microscope: An Empirical Investigation of Patent Holders as Litigants,
99 MINN. L. REV. 649, 662 (2014).
71. This is a one-directional result because once a patent is found invalid in one lawsuit,
it is invalid with respect to the world. The asymmetric, mutually exclusive effects of collateral
estoppel would only affect patents that were found valid in multiple lawsuits.
72. Choosing a later litigation date allows better matching of examiners to the litigation
because it is more likely that the examiner will have a fuller employment history (between 2001
and 2011) when using a later litigation date.
73. Invalidated patents include: 1990-3 patents; 1991-10 patents; 1992-8 patents;
1993-13 patents; 1994-13 patents; 1995-21 patents; 1996-14 patents; 1997-11 patents;
1998-37 patents; 1999-27 patents; 2000-29 patents; 2001-23 patents; 2002-29 patents;
2003-28 patents; 2004-28 patents; 2005-19 patents; 2006-25 patents; 2007-24 patents;
2008-14 patents; and 2009-5 patents.
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A weakness with all descriptive historical models is that they
are limited by the factors that the study has analyzed. Thus, there
may be an omitted or confounding variable that accounts for the
observed outcomes. Without a study with controlled variables, this
study cannot determine whether the factors analyzed were the
definitive causes of the ultimate outcomes. For example, this study
assumes that the strength of the parties' legal positions was equal in
all cases, which may not be the case. Additionally, this study assumes
that the parties' legal counsel are equally skilled, which Janicke et al.
has found to be an important factor in determining outcomes.7 4 There
is some selection bias based on the fact that this study has only
included final decisions on validity. Specifically, there are a number
of inherent confounding variables that are associated with cases that
go to final judgment such as complexity of the technology, skill of
lawyers on each side, jury composition, judicial experience with patent
cases or patented technology, quality of expert witnesses, and the
financial resources of both parties. Thus, as with any litigation
dataset, this has selected a population that is highly abnormal just by
virtue of being litigated to final judgment.
V. RESULTS: EXAMINER CATEGORIZATION
In this Section, this study analyzes the characteristics of
patent examiners who issue patents that go to litigation that results
in a final disposition of the patent. This study segments the data both
by years of examiner service at the USPTO and by average volume of
patents issued per year. Years of service was determined by number
of years at the USPTO between the years of 2001 and 2012. Average
number of patents issued was determined by summing all patents
issued by the examiner between 2001 and 2012 and dividing by the
number of years at the USPTO between the years of 2001 and 2012.75
74. Janicke and Ren, supra note 46, at 16 (showing the regression with patentee as
winner); id. at 18 (showing the regression with the accused infringer as winner).
75. I did not count those years in which an examiner issues one and only one patent.
Accordingly, the data set is right censored in that I removed many of the examiners with the
lowest allowance rates. Additionally, I have removed examiners that could fall within these
categories: (1) those examiners who were only briefly at the USPTO, but left before issuing more
than one patent; (2) those examiners who are primary examiners who mainly review the work of
secondary examiners but issued one patent by themselves; (3) those examiners who have issued
one patent, but have not issued any since; (4) those examiners hired in December who may have
issued only one patent because of the ramp up time; and (5) examiners who came back to the
USPTO and needed time to ramp up during their return year. Additionally, these data do not
capture those examiners who truly have a zero allowance rate, since this data set only records
those examiners who have issued at least one patent.
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Briefly, most invalidated patents come from primary
examiners, which is unsurprising because they are the examiners who
are issuing most of the patents. Technology centers 1600, 2600, and
2800, which correspond to biotechnology, communications, and
semiconductors respectively, experience a higher invalidation rate
than other technology centers. Novelty (35 U.S.C. § 102) and
obviousness (35 U.S.C. § 103) rejections were the most common means
for invalidating patents. Most references used to invalidate patents
were not cited at the USPTO (only 22.8 percent of the references were
cited at the USPTO). If the invalidating reference was a US patent,
the reference was found and considered only 32 percent of the time.
These data suggest that patent examiners are neither searching for
nor finding relevant prior art references.
A. General Statistics
As a preliminary matter, this study determined the percentage
of invalidated versus validated patents in our dataset. This study
found that approximately 35 percent of the patents in our data set
were found invalid (Figure 1). Furthermore, this study segmented
the validated patents into two groups: (1) infringed (approximately 41
percent) and (2) non-infringed (approximately 23 percent) (Figure 2).
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Figure 2. Validated Patents: Infringed versus Non Infringed.
U Invalid 0 Non infringed I Infringed
B. Segmentation by Technology Center
This study segmented the data by technology center to
determine which technology centers experience the most invalidated
patents. As shown in Figure 3, technology centers 1600, 2600, and
2800, which correspond to biotechnology, communications, and
semiconductors, respectively, experience a higher invalidation rate
than other technology centers. This is unsurprising since these
technology centers also experience the highest rates of litigation. The
technology centers are coded as follows 76:
Technology Center Technology Type
Technology Center 1600 Biotechnology and Organic Chemistry
Technology Center 1700 Chemical and Materials Engineering
Technology Center 2100 Computer Architecture, Software, and
Information Security
Technology Center 2400 Computer Networks, Mutliplex
Communication, Video Distribution and
Security




Technology Center 2600 Communications
Technology Center 2700 Old computer related technology center
that was divided into technology centers
2100 and 260077
Technology Center 2800 Semiconductors, Electrical, and Optical
Systems and Components
Technology Center 2900 Designs
Technology Center 3600 Transportation, Construction, Electronic
Commerce, Agriculture, National Security,
and License & Review
Technology Center 3700 Mechanical Engineering, Manufacturing,
Products
Interestingly, technology center 1600 (biotechnology)
experiences the highest percentage of invalidated patents (42 percent
invalidated), in contrast to technology centers 1700 (chemical and
materials engineering) and 2100 (computer architecture, software,
and information security), which experience the lowest percentage of
invalidated patents (22 percent and 19 percent invalidated,
respectively). This study notes that valid patents include patents that
were found valid and non-infringed as well as patents that were found
valid and infringed. Similar to the 1998 Allison study,
78 this study
finds that there is virtually no difference between the validity rates of
patents in different fields of invention. Biotechnology patents may be
an exception because they suffer from a slightly higher invalidation
rate (approximately 42 percent) than the average invalidation rate
(approximately 29 percent).
77. Note that technology center 2700 was subdivided into technology centers 2100 and
2600 to accommodate growth in computer related applications. See Wynn Coggins, Technology
Center 2700 Splits to Accommodate Growth in Computer-Related Applications, USPTO TODAY,
Nov. 2000, at 12.
78. Allison & Lemley, supra note 10, at 251-52.
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Figure 3. Percent Valid versus Invalid Patents by Technology
Center.
U Percent Valid 2 Percent Invalid
90% T-
80% -
2800 2900 3600 3700
C. Segmentation by Examiner Type
Next, this study segmented the litigation data into three
categories: (1) invalidated patents, (2) patents found valid and
infringed, and (3) patents found valid but non-infringed. It was then
determined which type of examiner issued each category of litigated
patent (Figures 4a and 4b). Unsurprisingly, primary examiners
issued the majority of both invalidated as well as valid patents (both
infringed and non-infringed). This is unsurprising because primary
examiners issue most of the patents at the USPTO.79
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Figure 4b. Number of Infringed versus Non-Infringed













VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.
D. Segmentation by Examiner Years of Experience and Volume of
Patents Issued
Next, the data was segmented by the number of years of
experience the examiner had at the USPTO (Figure 5a). Interestingly,
those examiners who are issuing the most litigated patents
(examiners with four to six years of experience)80 are actually not
issuing a higher-than-expected number of invalidated patents.
81
However, similar to what a previous study found with the total
number of litigated patents, primary examiners with only one or two
years of experience issue litigated patents at a lower than expected
rate.8
2
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This study also tracked the number of patents found valid
when adjudicated to final judgment (Figure 5b). This figure shows the
increase of litigated patents between years four and seven. This
figure supports our previous finding that patent examiners with four
80. Tu, supra note 4, at 535.
81. Expected invalidation rates were calculated by multiplying the total number of
invalidated patents by the percentage of patents issued by the specific population of examiners.
For a full description of expected rates, see also id. at 529 (2014).
82. Id. at 535.
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to six years of experience issue litigated patents at a higher than
expected rate.8 3 These data, taken together, suggest that examiners
with four to six years of experience issue more litigated patents, but
do not issue more invalidated patents.
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E. Segmentation by Examiner Output
Finally, this study segments the invalidated patents by
examiner output-the average number of patents issued per year
(Figure 6a). Examiner output is an overall grant rate for the
examiner comprising all years of the examiner's tenure at the USPTO.
Average grant rate is determined by summing all patents issued by an
examiner between 2001 and 2012 and dividing by the number of years
at the USPTO between 2001 and 2012. Here, examiners who issue
between thirty-one and fifty patents per year on average are issuing
invalidated patents at a higher rate. This roughly corresponds to
what was previously found, where patent examiners who issue
between forty-five and sixty patents per year on average were issuing
litigated patents at a higher than expected rate.8 4 Correspondingly,
83. Id. at 535.
84. Id. at 529.
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this study segmented the validated patents by examiner output,
further breaking down the validated patents by both validated patents
that were infringed and non-infringed (Figure 6b).
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Figure 6b. Number of Validated Patents by Examiner Output.
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VI. RESULTS: INVALIDATION ANALYSIS
This Section focuses on the invalidated patents and analyzes
the legal theories used to invalidate those patents. This study also
analyzes the prior art type, which includes US patents, foreign
patents, or non-patent references. This study also looked at whether
the prior art was cited during the prosecution history.
35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103 prior art references are the most
common invalidation bases used by accused infringers. US patents
comprise approximately 46 percent of the prior art that is used to
invalidate patents. In 77 percent of the cases reviewed, the examiner
did not find the invalidating prior art. If the prior art was a US
patent, the prior art was not found in 51.8 percent of the cases
examined. These data imply that examiner searching-as opposed to
misinterpretation of the prior art-is the primary cause of error at the
USPTO.
A. Segmentation by Invalidation Type
First, this study focused on which legal theories were used to
invalidate patents. If multiple rationales were used to invalidate a
patent, I coded each rationale as an independent method for
invalidation. Additionally, this study segmented each invalidation
method into examiner type (Figure 7). Interestingly, only secondary
examiners issued patents that were later invalidated on § 101
ineligible subject matter grounds. Prior art novelty and obviousness
rejections were the main methods used to invalidate patents,
comprising 21.5 percent and 35.4 percent of invalidations,
respectively.
Allison et al. have recently found that indefiniteness challenges
to validity have increased dramatically since those authors' 1998
study.8 5 Although this study did not see a similar increase in
invalidation by indefiniteness, this could be because many of these
patents were first litigated in early 2000s. This study focused on
those litigations that terminated between 2010 and 2012. This study's
results still mirror many of the conclusions found in the 1998 Allison
et al. study.
8 6
85. Allison, Lemley & Schwartz, supra note 10, at 1782.
86. Allison & Lemley, supra note 10, at 251-52.
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Figure 7. Number of Invalidated Patents by Method of
Invalidation.
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B. Segmentation by Prior Art
This study next focused on the prior art because §§ 102 and
103 prior art rejections comprised the major method of invalidation in
our data set. Specifically, this study wanted to determine if the prior
art references were being misinterpreted or if the prior art references
were not being found by the USPTO. To determine this, this study
reviewed the prosecution history of each patent, searching for the
invalidating prior art reference, which may be foreign patents, US
patents, or patent applications, and non-patent literature, in both non-
final and final rejections. Additionally, the Information Disclosure
Statements were searched to determine if the applicant initially cited
the reference.8 7 Finally, this study reviewed the face of the patent in
the "References Cited" section to determine if the prior art patent was
either cited by the examiner or cited by the applicant.
Of the patents that were invalidated using §§ 102 or 103 prior
art references, only 22.8 percent of those patents cited to the
invalidating prior art reference during prosecution (Figure 8). These
87. The Information Disclosure Statement is a list of US patents, US patent
applications, foreign patents, or publications that the applicant feels may be important for





data suggest that a major problem with patent quality is examiner
searching and finding of appropriate prior art. These data suggest
that once the prior art is found, examiners generally can interpret the
prior art reference correctly.
Figure 8. Patents Cited to the Invalidating Prior Art
Reference During Prosecution.
a Cited UNot Cited
This study then looked further into the type of prior art
references that were invalidating patents. Specifically, this study
determined the percentage of US patents and US patent applications
used as prior art references (Figure 9). As shown in Figure 9, most of
the prior art references that are invalidating patents are not US
patents or US patent applications. However, a significant minority of
references (38 percent) are US patents or US patent applications,
which are clearly available and searchable for examiners.
20151
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Figure 9. US Patents Used as Prior Art References.
*Used 9 Not Used
This study then further reviewed the US patents and US
patent applications that were used as invalidating prior art by looking
at the prosecution history of these patents to determine if the US
patent or US patent application was cited during prosecution (Figure
10). This study found that when US patents or US patent applications
were used as invalidating prior art, the examiner had not found the
art during prosecution in the overwhelming majority of cases. Again,
these data suggest that the examiners are not finding the relevant
prior art during prosecution. Thus, a significant number of prior art
references used by litigants to invalidate patents are US patents or
US patent applications. Patent examiners should be able to catch
these references because these references are relevant, certainly
available, and searchable by US patent examiners.
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Figure 10. Timing of Locating US Patents as Prior Art.
R During Prosecution During Litigation
VII. SOLUTIONS
As shown by the data, one of the significant issues facing
examiners is searching for and finding relevant prior art. Most
significantly, one possible way to increase the quality of the prior art
search is to create a two-track system for patent examiners. This
innovation may allow the USPTO to simulate the experience of
seasoned examiners who issue less-litigated, invalidated patents in a
much shorter amount of time. A division of labor where one group of
examiners specializes in prior art searching, while another group of
examiners specializes in drafting office actions could mimic the
specialization of one senior examiner in a much shorter timeframe.
88
Specifically, the first track would be a prior art searching track,
and the second track would be an office-action generation track. Prior
art searching examiners would specialize and have sole responsibility
for completing prior art searching. This new arrangement would
allow some examiners to specialize deeply in creating targeted
keyword searches for a variety of different inventions within the same
art unit or workgroup. The second track would consist of office-action
88. Tu, supra note 4, at 542.
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generation, based in large part on the results gathered from the prior
art searchers. Office-action generation examiners would specialize in
understanding and applying the relevant patent law and would have
sole responsibility for composing complete office actions that correctly
apply the law. This change would allow specialization in the writing
skills necessary to convey clear rejections. Specialization should also
decrease the workload per examiner and result in faster and more
efficient application processing rates.89
Additionally, this two-track system would combat the
incomplete or piecemeal search by the examiner in the first action
with a more complete search in the "final" action. Patent quality
should increase because relevant prior art would be determined in the
first instance. Additionally, prosecution times would decrease because
office actions would be written in a clear and coherent manner on
relevant patent laws such that applicants could determine the real
issue at hand. Applicants would be able to identify the precise point of
disagreement so that the applicant could provide well-targeted
arguments. In general, there may be an increase in "quality" patents,
because relevant art would be found and clear rejections would be
written by examiners. Prosecution histories would be clearer, and
those issues in litigation that had been previously vetted by the
examiner would be distinct.
There are several possible limitations with this two-track
system. Foremost, this division of labor would limit the office-action
generation examiners' knowledge of the relevant prior art, and
therefore dull their ability to gauge the novelty or non-obviousness of
the invention. Additionally, for particularly complex inventions,
increased searching costs may be experienced when the invention is
incorrectly classified.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
Patent quality in many ways is tied to not only good patent and
claim drafting by the applicant, but also to good examination at the
USPTO. This study attempted to characterize the type of examiner
who issues litigated and invalidated patents. Along with my previous
studies,90 this study shows that primary examiners allow the most
patents that are later found invalid. This is unsurprising since
primary examiners allow the majority of patents.
89. Id.
90. See generally Tu, supra note 2; Tu, supra note 4.
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This study also suggests that patent searching may play a
greater role in improving patent quality. In particular, this study
found that patents are invalided mainly based on prior art references
that were not found by either the applicant or the patent examiner.
Specifically, 77 percent of the prior art references used to invalidate
patents were not found by the USPTO. Additionally, many of these
references were US patents or US patent applications. In cases where
the invalidating prior art was a US patent or US patent application,
the invalidating references were not found by the patent examiner 89
percent of the time. Given the ease of examiner access to US patent
and US patent application references, this is surprising.
One possible solution to this issue is to divide patent examiners
into two separate tracks. One track would focus on searching and
finding the most appropriate and relevant prior art references
(searching examiners). A second track would focus on generating
appropriate office actions based on the prior art received from the
searching examiners (office-action generation examiners). This
division of labor would have the advantage of specialization, which
might increase the quality of both the prior art reviewed during
prosecution as well as substantively improving the quality of the office
actions. As shown in this study as well as in our previous study,91
high-volume examiners who have more experience issue less-litigated
patents and also fewer patents that are later held invalid.
Accordingly, if the USPTO could mimic more experienced high-volume
examiners by specialization and division of labor, we might decrease
the number of litigated patents that are later held invalid.
91. Tu, supra note 4, at 528.
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